By publishing a Thematic Section on the Vale tailing dam disaster in Brumadinho, Minas Gerais State, Brazil, Cadernos de Saúde Pública is honoring an important mission by calling on the academic community to reflect on the worst social and environmental disaster in Brazil's history and one of the most serious in the world. In three articles, the journal's readers will have the opportunity to examine current knowledge on the disaster's causes and effects. With well-crafted reporting based on the available evidence soon after the disaster, Milanez et al. 1 unveil the dynamics of the state's hijacking by the mining industry and corporate tentacles in environmental policy. Freitas et al. 2 focus on public health and the organization of services to examine the links between the Samarco and Vale disasters. Noal et al. 3 address the relevant issue of the disaster's impacts on the mental health of a large contingent of victims and the psychosocial care mobilized in the initial phase of the response.
One does not have to be an expert in geotechnical engineering to realize that the upstream heightening technique to dispose of tailings, in which the dam is partially laid on unstable tailings in the reservoir, is clearly less safe, although cheaper than other techniques. The additional risk has been extensively documented by the technical community 5 and had already been explicitly contraindicated in a Brazilian ruling ("The upstream dam heightening method is not recommended") 6 .
The more contemporary discussion concerns the use of any form of tailing dams: "The Resolution n. 143/2012 10 establishes criteria for classifying dams according to the variables of risk category and potential harm. For both classifications, the criteria are based on a scoring system with the sum of the dam's characteristics, which are assigned values, such as height and length, the existence of a safety plan, and the dam's state of conservation. The score classifies the dam as high, medium, or low risk or harm.
Both dams, Fundão in Mariana and Feijão in Brumadinho, had been classified in the lowest risk category. These two cases alone suffice to demonstrate the criteria's absolute inadequacy. The technocratic criterion that assigns quantitative scores to different dam characteristics is unable to truly capture the risks of collapse, since it overlooks the fact that in some cases a single factor, which can predominate and suffice to condemn the structure, is diluted by other less significant factors.
If this methodology was not altered after the Samarco tragedy in Mariana, thus failing to call attention to the dire risk of the existing dams, like the one in Brumadinho, the hope is for an urgent review of these procedures, which was emphasized by United Nations humans rights experts: "We call upon the Brazilian Government to prioritize the safety evaluations
of existing dams and rectify current licensing and safety inspection processes to avoid the recurrence of this tragic incident. We further call upon the Government not to authorize any new tailing dams nor allow any activities that would affect the integrity of existing ones until safety is ensured" 11 .
Why is the environmental licensing process for industries still so permissive, and why are the licensing bodies so heavily influenced by corporations?
Highly symbolic in this regard is the vote on authorization for decommissioning the B1 dam of the Córrego do Feijão mine by the Minas Gerais State Council for Environmental Policy (COPAM) on December 11, 2018 This type of weakness in the environmental licensing process, the control over decision-making bodies by companies with vested interests, and the state's hijacking by these interests have been the object of numerous observations and exposés, as documented in the article by Milanez et al. 1 and in other academic study 13 .
Another angle that deserve mention is the lack of accountability on the part of collegiate body members, both from the point of view of representation and legitimacy and the responsibility for the decisions made.
Why are the mining companies allowed to monitor themselves?
The fact that self-monitoring is taken for granted, especially by mining companies, is another facet of the licensing process with no impartiality or autonomy. Adopted on the questionable grounds of transferring the costs of monitoring to the potential polluter, selfmonitoring without government oversight is based on the assumption that all the agents in the process genuinely and exclusively intend to watch over environmental quality and human health. This is obviously not the case in a competitive economic environment based on maximizing profits, proper to these corporate sectors.
A study on water quality monitoring in the Rio Itabirito basin revealed weaknesses in this process, especially in the action by the environmental agency and in the results' credibility. Undersized infrastructure and loss of qualification of state agencies have also prevented adequate assessment of the reports 14 .
The same principle, but even more serious, applies to self-monitoring of dam safety. 15 .
Therefore, in addition to a situation that undermines inspection and control (typical government activities) and transfer of the job of monitoring to the vested interests themselves, a pervasive institutional environment allows the companies to issue or induce the production of fraudulent reports on the dams' risks.
Why does time hurt the victims and benefit the companies? Why don't the institutional arrangements to address the effects of the disasters favor the victims?
The negotiations over reparations for damages from the Samarco disaster, including compensation and fines, involved countless stakeholders and stages, resulting in a dubious outcome. "The tactic of using time to erase the tragedy's tracks" 16 (p. 81) has been widely identified.
Meanwhile, the institutional solution to deal with the reparations -the creation of the Renova Foundation -contradicted the initial proposal of creating a public foundation under private law, which would have ensured its public management without losing the agility needed to receive funds and make expenditures. The solution that was finally adopted meant that the funds remained "under the company's total control" 17 and with "a deplorable lack of transparency and of the victims' participation in the negotiations" 18 . It also gave the company autonomy in settling out of court and of determining those who were (and were not) "affected" by the dam's collapse, as emphasized by Milanez et al. 1 .
Thus, the obsession with cutting costs has proceeded unabated after the disasters, often with the state's blessing.
Which workers' health policy authorizes installing a dining hall and administrative building downstream from dams with high risk of collapsing? Why did the sirens fail in both tragedies?
These are obviously questions without answers, since the situations are so absurd. There is a clear criminal liability: "When you do something knowing that it can produce a risk, that act is criminally liable and involves the same severity as when a drunk driver runs over a pedestrian" (testimony by Flávio Batista, University of São Paulo) 19 . However, the trial and conviction of the guilty parties continue at a snail's pace.
What are the effects of the mining disasters on health?
Disasters of such magnitude result in complex effects, difficult to identify and measure, and that change over time. Freitas et al. 2 and Noal et al. 3 point appropriately to a set of potential effects, both on the mental health of the direct victims, and from the results of mobilization of the tailings after the dams' collapse, affecting water, soil, air, and ecosystems, including the vector, host, and reservoir cycle. But while we researchers have an idea of the potential risks, we appear to lack adequate answers on how such risks have been expressed in reality, nor do we have sufficient means to communicate the risks to populations and social movements.
An emblematic issue in this sense is the result of the deterioration of water quality on the health of people living near the water basins and of those whose public water supply depends on the waters affected by such risks. Water monitoring along the Rio Doce, for example, still shows high concentrations of various hazardous substances, even three years after the Samarco disaster, involving various metals and other solids 20 . Little is known about the chronic effects of exposure to high levels of harmful chemical substances, while the limits to substances in water are established on the basis of lifetime consumption. In this regard, the scientific community still needs to provide the affected communities with better answers.
The prediction of the effects from the Brumadinho tragedy can obviously benefit from studies already developed on the Rio Doce, but they should take its specificities into account, such as the tailings' downstream movement, the different capacity for dilution in the Rio Paraopeba, the effect of the Três Marias dam on attenuating the pollution, and the uncertainties concerning the downstream impact on the Rio São Francisco.
By way of conclusion, while this text raises a series of questions that are still hovering in the air concerning the context of Brazilian mining and the consequences of the more recent disasters, there is something extremely serious in this field that should be translated into a collective agenda committed to the health and wellbeing of populations threatened by mining operations in Brazil.
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